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progress, constantly in a dialectical relation of both challenging
and being challenged by the order of things.
On one Internet site, “I Am Not Trayvon Martin” is headed
“She Speaks Truth.” This burdensome tribute allows entry into
some closing thoughts concerning pedagogy, the white antiracist scholar, and the Black anti-racist scholar. Certainly the
truth of the video is one that did not originate among whites.
One of the most challenging remarks directed towards my
lectures on whiteness takes a similar form. After talks as an
invited lecturer I am regularly taken aside by a listener of color
who thanks me for saying “things like what I’ve been saying
myself ” but without being heard. The praise was gratifying on
the first few hearings but it also troubles matters, sometimes
designedly so. That is, the praise underlines that whiteness
structures who gets believed and esteemed even in discussing
whiteness. Moreover the “things like what I’ve been saying”
phrasing underlines, subconsciously perhaps, how much
white writers on whiteness borrow from long traditions of
such study by thinkers from groups for whom whiteness has
most murderously been a problem. For me, trained in African
American history, debts to Toni Morrison, Sterling Stuckey,
Langston Hughes, Ida B. Wells, bell hooks, and, among many
others, above all James Baldwin and W.E.B. Du Bois, can be
acknowledged but cannot be fully repaid.
“Like what I have been saying” also helps us to understand
that what is being said is also not just the same across the color
line and this conditions reception. I have disappointed the
shows of Bill O’Reilly, Glenn Beck, and other right-wing media
figures who regularly discover the existence of “Whiteness
Studies” courses and want to ridicule on television someone
teaching one. I have never taught courses on the critical study of
whiteness as in my view whiteness cannot be understood apart
from the experiences of peoples racialized as not white. Thus,
when my students read about whiteness they do so as part of
courses on ethnic studies. In the fascinating class sessions on
whiteness that Yancy describes, his expertise and experience
ensure that a course centered on whiteness is about a social
relationship.
I do lecture frequently on whiteness visiting in other
cities. When I do, the sorts of direct expressions of doubt and
opposition from the audience that Yancy recounts rarely surface
during the lecture, the Q and A that follows, or talks with faculty
and students over meals. Opposition is generally expressed
via email, anonymously, rarely, and after the fact. Tears are
very occasional, most recently when I argued against the idea
of “white culture” and a Missouri student cried, “If I can’t be
white, what can I be?”
Years ago, as I was thinking about the coexistence of white
young people’s love of Black culture and their racism, I asked an
African American colleague to help me to sort the question out.
He then went to speak at a local high school and briefly mused
on how it was that cheerleaders there might go to the “more
Black,” urban high school to see dance moves but not want
to attend an integrated school. The results included disorder
in the gym, a vicious campaign against him in the newspaper,
and threats. I could have spoken those same lines with only
sullenness and silent dismissal as the result. Such a positionality
makes my life easier but troublingly so. It makes my teaching
about whiteness more predictable and less impactful than that
described in Look, a White!
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I read Look, a White! in various coffee shops and libraries
throughout Los Angeles, California, and Buffalo, New York.
Never has a book in my hand attracted so much attention.
Written across the light blue cover the word “White” stands
out in large print and rests above an index finger pointed
upward. This somehow manages to antagonize passersby while
simultaneously creating a sense of what can only be called
“entitled curiosity.” On several occasions, I was interrupted by
strangers who glanced at the cover of the book and could not
resist asking questions or making comments: “What are you
reading?” “What is that book about?” “Wow, that seems like
an interesting topic…” and, eventually, “Who wrote that book?”
Most appeared shocked and, to be quite honest, suspicious that
I was reading about whiteness, maybe because I am Latino.
They were even more surprised that the book’s author is African
American. “I don’t see what a Black man can know about
whiteness” summarizes most of the responses.
Soon after I finished the text I realized that this is exactly
what George Yancy wants. Look, a White! challenges readers
to “nominalize” the various ways whiteness permeates their
life and our society: “Nomination brings attention to, discloses,
renders ethically problematic, a network of iterative power
relations, normative assumptions, and calcified modes of
being that are created and defined by whiteness” (23). In this
sense, the suspicion I perceived might not have anything to do
with my identity but the fact that whiteness is being discussed
openly and honestly throughout an entire text, especially one
written by a Black man.
Nominalizing whiteness is crucial to combating the
evolving, dynamic nature of racism. In today’s “progressive”
era, people are often comfortable talking about race when
it pertains to the ways in which minorities are negatively
impacted and socially determined by unjust socioeconomic
and political forces. Yancy’s text, however, “flips the script”
and, in doing so, shows how nuanced his argument is. Look, A
White! nominalizes whiteness by highlighting the ways in which
race positively impacts those who tend to think of themselves
as race-less, namely, whites. The positive impact that race has
on the lives of white people comes at the expense of those
who are denied social goods and various forms of recognition,
namely, racialized minorities. Anti-Black racism is thus “socially
axiomatic” in social spaces where whiteness is taken for granted
and constitutes the norm (19). This is what Naomi Zack labeled
“whiteness-as-antiblack-racism” (x).
Yancy’s text demonstrates how racism always accompanies
whiteness, regardless of whether white people intend on being
racist. A common response to the charge of racism is that
one cannot be racist since there are no races. This sentiment
appeals to the non-reality of race in order to abate the detection
of racism. Here, discussions pertaining to the ontological
status of race often serve as a red herring to exploring the
lived significance of racism. Yancy subverts this maneuver
by “bracketing”1 or suspending questions pertaining to the
ontological status of race, i.e., the nonreferential status of
the concept (17). This bracketing allows for reflection upon
mundane social interactions and embodied social phenomena,
those very places that so many people think of as race-less, often
because they do not intend any harm or because whiteness
constitutes the norm (which is why the book is about naming
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whiteness). Yancy writes, “My point is twofold. First, to restrict
the problem of race to conceptual analysis full stop is too
limiting. Second, an exploration of race as lived takes one
beyond what is thought about in the abstract to the level of
how race is meaningfully lived as an embodied and messy
phenomenon” (19).
This book, however, is not just about identifying whiteness
in its various manifestations. Much like in Black Bodies, White
Gazes: The Continuing Significance of Race (2008), Yancy argues
that anti-Black racism reveals more about white identity than
the actual nature of Black people. Whiteness implies structures
of domination, institutional and classical forms of racism, and
asymmetrical social relations that hinder human subjectivityformation for both whites and Blacks (not to mention “others”).
The insidious nature of whiteness is the way it obscures these
structures of domination and perverse social relations, thus
eliding social critique and political rectification.
For the author, the sinister description “Look, a Negro!”
should read: “Look, a projection of white fears, insecurity and
hate, but something desperately needed for white identity
(a.k.a. a ‘Negro’)!” Yancy tells the reader,
At the heart of whiteness is a profound disavowal: “I
am not that!” In other words, whiteness is secured
through marking what it is not. Yet what it (whiteness)
is not (blackness in this case) is a false construction
that whites themselves have created to sustain their
false sense of themselves as ontologically superior.
However, it is a form of superiority that involves the
subordination of their freedom. (20)
Predicated on the via negativa (that which it is not), whiteness
requires anti-whiteness as a constituting facet of white identity.
More specifically, whiteness needs Blackness for its existence.2
“Whiteness gains its ontological purchase,” Yancy explains,
“through the construction and degradation of nonwhiteness.
Thus, to ‘authenticate’ their whiteness, they [whites] must
enact a form of white solipsism whereby the nonwhite is erased
and devalued, reduced to a form of nonbeing” (116-117). The
“solipsistic” dimension of this problem—which I return to
below—becomes visible when one realizes that “Blackness”
is a construct of white lies about the Black body.
Disabusing the lies that are told about the Black body
is perhaps the work of those thinkers concerned with the
ontological status of race, which begs the question as to whether
one can completely separate abstract discussions from the
lived-density project. Put differently, the experience of racism
is so severe that it is almost impossible to completely place
the nonreferential status of “race” on hold. As Yancy explains,
“In a form of sociality that is fundamentally structured by race
and racism, black people . . . undergo ontological truncating
traumatic experiences in the face of white others who refuse to
recognize their humanity. In short, blacks are reduced to their
epidermis, and so the experience of black people vis-à-vis race/
racism presupposes the existence of white others” (19). Is the
racialized Black body, that which is “truncated” and marked
as inferior, necessary for racist sentiment? If so, racists need
to denigrate the Black body in order to bolster their racism.
Racism thus attempts to render people objects, it permeates
the ontological status of Black people. My question, then, is
whether or not the lived-density of “race,” that which is explored
using the phenomenological analysis, always reverts back to
its referential status?
If a positive formulation of whiteness is possible, one
that does not depend upon the suppression, domination,
and misrecognition of Otherness, then it remains to be seen.
While the average white person walking down the street may

not be the progenitor of this perverse social dependency, they
are implicated in racism in several ways. Just how they are
implicated is the main question that follows.
Yancy pushes the reader to rethink both the explicit and
implicit forms of racism/whiteness perpetuated by our existence
in this racist world. Racism, in this view, is like original sin within
the Christian tradition.3 It is a sin imposed upon us by the actions
of those who came before. Even though we may not have bitten
any apple, all are held accountable on the basis of simply being
born of flesh. Unlike original sin, however, no baptism shall
cleanse one of whiteness and the racism that comes along with
it. Rather than be dismissive or overly compensatory, Yancy
asks white people to dwell on their whiteness, to give thought
to a topic where usually there is none.4 To dwell on whiteness
is not to dismiss the question of racism in light of one’s lack
of racist intent or appeals to meritocracy. Similarly, quietism in
response to the inability to shed one’s self of racism cannot be
an option. Wrestling with the fact that one may never be capable
of ridding herself of racism or, for that matter, whiteness, and
seeing this as a “problem” is what Yancy desires. This is no easy
task and there may be no way of saving oneself from whiteness,
nor is it Yancy’s job to provide hope that something like that is
possible (174-175).
Through the use of the phenomenological tradition and
recognition theories of human subjectivity-formation, white
people are offered the opportunity to gain a critical consciousness
that reveals how white identity is indebted to racism and
racialized Others. For Yancy, human identity does not form in a
vacuum, nor are we the atomistic, unencumbered self of much
of modern thought. Instead, humans are social beings, and our
social nature has a determinant effect on our agency. We are
born into a world we did not create, we come to terms with
ourselves in languages that we did not found, and we inherit
social positions that are not of our doing.5 Human agency may
still exist in varying degrees depending upon an assortment of
factors (i.e., class, gender, nationality, one’s relationship to white
privilege), but we are not free to define ourselves from nothing.
How we recognize ourselves, are recognized by others, and the
continuity or discontinuity stemming from these interactions is
crucial to Yancy’s critique of whiteness.
More important, as the chapter on pedagogy suggests, is
the understanding of the self as a work in progress transformed
and shaped through intersubjective social situations that often
force growth through discomfort. “Philosophy is not about
technocratic control in my classrooms but about practices of
dialogical mutual freedom, dialogical reciprocity, and forms of
communicative emancipation that are not afraid to walk the
edge of danger to concede that one was mistaken—indeed
blatantly so” (133). Whiteness distorts, obviates, and even mutes
the unfolding of the self, both in the classroom and in everyday
social interactions. While whites and Blacks are impacted by
this stultification, the former do not realize the extent of the
limitations and in fact benefit by not knowing this.
Whiteness requires a non-dialectic, sometimes called an
epistemic monologue or what Enrique Dussel calls an “antidialogue.”6 Whiteness does this through the projection and
imposition of white ideas about what African Americans are like
or supposed to be, what Yancy calls “white solipsism.” White
solipsism occurs when whites expect African Americans to be
nothing more than stereotypic imaginings of Blacks as criminals,
welfare recipients, drug dealers, gang members, and the like.
Yancy brilliantly describes this as “anterior guilt” (2). Reflecting
on Frantz Fanon’s experience of being singled out by a young
white boy as a “Negro,” Yancy writes:
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Fanon has done nothing save be a Negro. Yet this
is sufficient. The Negro has always already done
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something by virtue of being a Negro. It is an anterior
guilt that always haunts the Negro and his or her
present and future actions. After all, that is what it
means to be a Negro—to have done something wrong.
The little white boy’s utterance is felicitous against
a backdrop of white lies and myths about the black
body. (2)
Notice the use of “always already,” a phrase employed at least
twelve times throughout the text. Like the idea of “arriving
already,” which Yancy also relies upon to describe the feeling
of being represented before having a chance to speak for one’s
self, “always already” does the work of explaining the way
African Americans are claimed by white ideas about them.
The nature of time in the racist world becomes an
interesting issue at this point, especially the “anteriority” or
“claimed” nature of Black people. In white solipsism whites
are seemingly the only people who temporally advance or
develop, albeit through their own projections. Blacks remain
caught in a vicious web of deceit about what they are supposed
to be (past tense). One can easily see how this connects with
the idea of an inferior, historicized Black body, as opposed to
the modern white self of the future, the only being capable
of making history and not just being a part of it.7 Rather than
actually encounter and exchange with a Black person, which
would allow an authentic dialogue to unfold, whites simply
resort to expectations about African Americans. This is a
form of idealism; one is not actually engaging with the real
world or other people, but only ideas. Nonetheless, this is an
idealism that is very real, as Trayvon Martin’s murder reminds
us. Being stuck in their own solipsistic world, whites limit their
social and personal development. White identity formation is
inchoate. Given the resentment and resistance Yancy receives
from his students, one might think that most white people
are comfortable in this half-baked state (which is why Yancy
seeks to disrupt this continuity). White solipsism results in a
suspension of human social development. It is the denial of
humanity in the white self and the racialized other.
For African Americans who are forced to live, or at least
have to contend with on a daily basis, white projections of
fear, hate, and insecurity, being misrecognized does not allow
them to fully blossom into human beings. Black subjectivity is
also muted, stunted, hindered, and handcuffed. The operative
modes of whiteness hold us back from realizing our common
humanity. It is whiteness that is the problem, a form of laziness.
One is too lazy to be human in the sense that one does not want
to or has been conditioned to ignore other people. At what point
this complacency or laziness becomes morally reprehensible
is where the debate ensues.
“Fanon is clear,” Yancy writes, “that the white boy, while
not fully realizing the complex, historical, psychological, and
phenomenological implications, has actually distorted his
(Fanon’s) body.” He continues, “The white boy, though, is not a
mere innocent proxy for whiteness. Rather, he is learning, at that
very moment, the power of racial speech, the power of racial
gesturing. He is learning how to think about and feel toward the
so-called dark Other. He is undergoing white subject formation,
a formation that is fundamentally linked to the object that he
fears and dreads” (3). Notice that some culpability lies with the
boy’s actions (he “is not a mere innocent proxy”). However,
as Yancy argues, the boy’s racial practices are “learned
effortlessly,” which is to say that “the white boy’s performance
points to fundamental ways in which many white children are
oriented, at the level of everyday practices, within the world,
where their bodily orientations are unreflected expressions of
the background lived orientations of whiteness, white ways of
being, white modes of racial and racist practice” (3).

I point out the tension between the boy’s culpability and
the fact that his racism is learned effortlessly, imposed from
outside. Many readers will object to this idea. The claim is that
the child is heteronomous, socialized into his racist views. Yet
this does not fit with Yancy’s thoughts. He argues that the boy
is not just the product of a “superimposed superstructural grid
of racist ideology” (3). The boy’s very comportment in a racist
world constitutes a form of racism. It is now too late for the boy;
he is doomed to be a racist. There may be varying degrees of
racism, but no escape from its grips.
Look, A White! problematizes debates on the nature and
ethics of racism, which, in Yancy’s view, is something that
exceeds questions of ill will, maliciousness, and hatred.8
Racism inhabits a shared social space where often times
people do not intend on being racist, they just are. It is “etched”
into their being (61). More specifically, however, the culpability
lies in failing to recognize their whiteness (perhaps?). They are
responsible for their ignorance or failure to know. This is a tough
point that not many whites will accept. I can see some people
being on board with the idea that they are culpable if they live
in bad faith and acknowledge their privilege but do not care to
do anything about it. Similarly, if whiteness does depend upon
the domination of Otherness, that too will implicate the white
boy in racist activity in a “noncontroversial” way (similar to how
I am implicated in sweatshop labor by buying Nike). But where
exactly does racist behavior become culpable in the case of
Fanon’s interaction with the boy? While it may be one thing to
say that it is a messy situation, this is not an argument that will
hold when holding people responsible for their actions.
Overall, Yancy’s project is commendable, especially for its
phenomenological analysis of race and racism. Let me give one
more example that attempts to show how embedded racism is
in our culture and why only the phenomenological analysis can
reach the depths of this kind of prejudice. Yancy argues that
the racist world we live in is a product of radical contingency;
we do not have to inhabit a world of white privilege: “There is,
however, no historical inevitability that necessitates the accrual
of white hegemony and the power of the white gaze to position
and subordinate nonwhites. White power and privilege are
fundamentally contingent. The scopic hegemony of whiteness
is grounded in structural, historical, and material processes of
subjugation, dispossession and imperial invasion” (110). This is
an important point to remember since people tend to view civil
rights movements and progressive moments in history in a light
that is only possible in the wake of racism. What I mean is that
in order for many people to fully appreciate something like our
first Black president, a history of colonization, slavery, lynching,
Jim Crow, and other atrocious events is required. In other words,
history tends to be viewed as teleological, and racism is rendered
necessary for our current appreciation of the world as it is. If that
is the case, what about the lives of those who died for the sake
of our unique appreciation of Obama’s accomplishment? When
it comes to racism this deeply embedded, we must not brook
any theodicies. Yancy will not let us.
Written in a prose that is inspiring, eloquent, and alive
(just see his comments on speaking in clicks, p. 30), Yancy’s
text guides the reader through an assortment of chapters on
the embedded nature of whiteness, drawing examples from
post-colonial literature, popular culture, and film (an entire
chapter on the movie White Chicks!). Along the way, the author
initiates helpful discussions about the various pedagogical
issues and academic dangers that come with asking people
to think seriously about whiteness and racism in historically
white universities. I highly recommend this text to philosophers
interested in the nature of whiteness and the complex question
of racism.
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Endnotes
1. I am importing the term “bracketing.” Here, the Husserlian
phenomenological roots of Yancy’s project become obvious.
2. In my forthcoming manuscript, Thinking about Justice from
“The Outside” of Nationality: Re-Examining the Legal and
National Dimensions of Citizenship, I argue that nationalism
and legal constructions of citizenship operate in a similar
fashion to Yancy’s views on whiteness. The ideas of “nation”
and legal personhood have no meaning outside of their
exclusive nature that denies membership or rights to those
born outside the state.
3. Yancy first made a comparison between racism and original
sin in “Elevators, Social Spaces and Racism” (Philosophy
& Social Criticism 34 [2008]). He writes, “My dark body
occludes the presumption of innocence. It is as if one’s
Blackness is a congenital defect, one that burdens the body
with tremendous inherited guilt. On this reading, one might
say that Blackness functions metaphorically as original sin.
There is not anything as such that a Black body needs to do
in order to be found blameworthy” (847).
4. See Chapter 6, especially p. 157 (bottom paragraph).
5. This last point will set up the objection many of Yancy’s
students level against him, namely, “I didn’t own slaves and
we didn’t create the oppressive social position that African
Americans inherit; therefore, I’m not implicated in anti-black
racism.” Although these are not of our doing, one can be
implicated in the maintenance of these social positions,
which begs the question as to the nature of racism (I will
return to this below).
6. See Enrique Dussel, Anti-Cartesian Meditations: On the Origin
of Philosophical Anti-Discourse of Modernity, trans. George
Ciccariello-Maher, www.enriquedussel.org (accessed April
5, 2010). Another idea that Dussel can offer Yancy is that of
analectics (“ano” and “logos,” the reason from beyond).
Dussel uses this idea to offer ways of getting past solipsistic
monologues, especially those of modernity. Rather than
attempt to find something of one’s self in the other (to
render something the “same” and thus obviate the alterity),
analectics is the reason from an-Other. It is the voice of the
Other who speaks from a position of oppression (a necessary
condition) and thus forces growth in the self.
7. White temporality depends upon that of blackness. Although
this may be a semantic issue, I do not agree with the
idea of “alterRenaissance” (see 87-93). In the chapter on
colonial semiotics (chapter 3), the idea of alterRenaissance
is introduced to explain how contemporeneous with the
development of modern humanisms and the modern self
is an alternative script about the inferiority of the colonized.
In line with Latin American philosophers, I see modern
humanisms as dependent upon the colonized. The colonized
as inferior is a constituent factor, not a coterminous event.
See Enrique Dussel, The Invention of the Americas: Eclipse
of “the Other” and the Myth of Modernity, trans. Michael D.
Baber (New York: Continuum, 1995).
8. For a classic account of racism that hinges on intent and
hatred, see J.L.A. Garcia’s “The Heart of Racism,” Journal of
Social Philosophy 27 (1996): 5-46. I often teach this essay in
conjunction with chapters from Yancy’s Black Bodies, White
Gazes. Garcia’s Kantian/Catholic views on racism make for
good comparison with Yancy’s phenomenological perspective.

The Pleasures of Dialogue: Responses to My
Interlocutors
George Yancy

Duquesne University
I edited Cornel West: A Critical Reader in 2001. It is the first book
in American history to explore the multifaceted philosophical

work of a living African American philosopher by, in this case,
his colleagues. As I stated then, the text was not to divinize
Cornel West, but to engage his work critically; indeed, to respect
his work through the activity of discursive engagement. In his
own lengthy and meta-philosophically insightful contribution to
that text, “Philosophy and the Funk of Life,” West writes, “How
sweet it is to be taken seriously by one’s colleagues and friends
in our fast-paced world of superficial praise and supercilious
putdown! How joyous it is to encounter critics who actually
have read one’s work in a careful and cautious manner.” In
stream with West, I would like to thank the six contributors
who eagerly agreed to read Look, a White! Philosophical Essays
on Whiteness and to give a careful and cautious reading of
the text. It is with the same careful and cautious reading that
I respond to their reviews. My hope is that this exchange will
bear important philosophical fruit and stimulate further critical
dialogue. I found each of the reviews to be honest, critical,
and insightful. I am honored by such a critical cadre. I take
responsibility for any errors in exegesis, faulty inferences, or
blatant misunderstandings.
Taine Duncan begins her insightful review by pulling from
Greek mythology, stating that just as Theseus betrayed Ariadne,
she is capable of repaying my work with thoughtlessness.
This sort of opening disclosure is what makes for mutual
vulnerability. The importance, in this case, of a white woman
admitting to betrayals vis-à-vis discussing my work on whiteness
is a fruitful place to begin. Indeed, Taine’s admission is logically
connected to the important and indefatigable need to mark
whiteness: Look, a white! As white, one has all sorts of reasons
to engage in betrayal. After all, whiteness has a proclivity to elide
its own complicity in white racist structures and practices. Part
of this self-marking is excellently performed where Duncan
writes, “It is easy as a white woman to say that I was never part
of the legacy of slaveholding since women were not allowed
to be property owners either. I have more in common with the
slave than the white man, right? Look, a white!— Me!” And at
the very end of her review, she writes “Look, a White!” after
describing how she thinks, as a white woman philosopher
teaching race theories, my book would work well in the
classroom as a resource manual for both undergraduate and
graduate students. By ending with “Look, a White!” she again
marks her whiteness as a site of opacity and possible ambush.
In this way, she nicely enacts some of the critical dimensions
of the text, applying to her own whiteness. She argues that
my work enacted “a sophisticated negative dialectics of
racism.” I appreciate her comparison here as I think that this
is an insightful one. I think that in terms of conceptualizing
whiteness/racism, there is a sense in which the complexity of
lived whiteness/racism leaves an excess and that we must call
into question the idea that antiracism is a concept that can be
mastered and performed successfully through some process
of Cartesian epistemic transparency.
Contrary to Duncan’s assessment that it is a book of essays
as opposed to a singular argument, I would argue that while it
is true this it is a book composed of essays this does not ipso
facto mean that it does not constitute a singular argument,
though one with multiple examples and diverse points of
analysis. She does say, though, that it is clear that Ariadne’s
thread traces from the introduction through all six chapters. I
would agree, however, that chapter three, which looks at the
work of Kamau Brathwaite vis-à-vis whiteness, does have a
sort of “independence.” I see this especially in terms of style
and its use of magical realism. Yet, the chapter was designed
to deploy Brathwaite’s work within the discursive framework
of the text, which was to mark whiteness, but to do so within
a colonial context. I appreciate Duncan’s reading and unique
interpretation of that chapter as “a wonderfully subversive
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